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SUMMARY tY CONCLUSIONS 
This paper addresses the application of fault 
trees to  the analysis of robot manipulator reliability 
and fault tolerance. Although a common and useful 
tool in other applications, fault trees have only re- 
cently been applied to  robots. In addition, most of the 
fault tree analyses in robotics have focused on qual- 
itative, rather than quantitative, analysis. Robotic 
manipulators present some special problems, due to  
the complex and strongly coupled nature of their sub- 
systems, and also their wild response to  subsystem 
failures. Additiondy, there is a lack of reliability 
data for robots and their subsystems. There has tra- 
ditionally been little emphasis on fault tolerance in 
the design of industrial robots, and data regarding 
operational robot failures is relatively scarce. 
However, at this time there is a new and critical 
need for safe and reliable robots for remote Environ- 
mental Restoration and Waste Management applica- 
tion?. The question of how to best incorporate fault 
tolerance and reliability into the design of such remote 
manipulators remains an open issue, and is the sub- 
ject of current research. This paper discusses aspects 
of the reliability problem in robotics, concentrating 
on the quantitative aspects of fault tree analysis for 
the design of robot manipulators. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In spite of the fact that robotics has been a 
rapidly developing area in the last few years, there 
has been relatively little work in robot reliability and 
fault tolerance until recently [15]. Robot manipula- 
tors are a critical mix of mechanical, electrical, and 
electronic components. Consequently, there are nu- 
merous critical failure modes inherent in a typical 
manipulator system. The situation is compounded 
by the fact that robot systems are highly dynamic, 
resulting in very rapid and wild responses of robots 
to  subsystem failures. Due to  the dynamic and non- 
linear nature of robots, much reliability analysis is 
necessarily complex and often both configuration and 
trajectory dependent. 
Robots are being increasingly deployed in re- 
mote and hazardous environments, which make re- 
liability and fault tolerance of even more critical im- 
portance than previously. Some key research in robot 
reliability is already under way [8, 11, 151. This pa- 
per discusses the particular concerns involved in the 
synthesis and analysis of fault trees for robotics ap- 
plications. Fault trees have only recently been ap- 
plied to  robots [5, 7, 141, where much of the work 
has been for qualitative analysis [15]. Our work is 
focused on remote manipulators for remediation of 
highly radioactive waste. This application presents 
special problems, as discussed in the following sec- 
tion. 
1.1 Notation List 
Ji Robot Joint i 
Si 
Mi 
x Component Failure Rate 
t Mission Time 
P Component Failure Probability 
pi [ ,  p i ,  p z ,  prr Component Failure Probability 
Robot Sensor i, Optical Encoder 
Robot Actuator i ,  Electric Motor 
Interval Points 
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2. ROBOTICS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL 
RESTORATION 
Robotic arms will be deployed to  assist in re- 
mediation of the waste tanks at the Hanford, Wash- 
ington, Nuclear Site. At Hanford, about 140, OOOm3 
of high-level radioactive waste is being stored in 149 
single-shell tanks (SSTs) [lo]. This waste has been 
produced at Hanford since the 1940’s as a by-product 
of processing spent nuclear fuel for uranium and plu- 
tonium recovery. 
The U S .  Department of Energy (DOE) has es- 
tablished a program to remove, treat, and dispose of 
the wastes stored in these underground tanks. The 
goal is t o  ‘develop and field retrieval systems with 
the capability to remove wastes from these tanks and 
transfer those wastes for further downstream process- 
ing’ [lo]. Long reach manipulators are the technology 
selected by DOE to remove the waste from the tanks. 
In earlier work [17], we have developed fault 
trees to support the design of an underground stor- 
age tank manipulator for Environmental Restoration 
and Waste Management [a]. The robot is t o  be de- 
ployed in single-shell underground storage tanks at 
the DOE site in Hanford, Washington. The manipu- 
lator is to be lowered into the tank from above, and is 
required to  move within the tank and remove or reme- 
diate waste in the tank as shown in Fig. 1. The pro- 
posed robot will be required to maneuver around var- 
ious pipes and debris within the underground storage 
tank. The waste removal end effector will need t o  be 
carefully positioned above the waste to  quickly and ef- 
fectively remove as much waste as possible. The robot 
will be kinematically redundant (have more than six 
joints) so that the manipulator will have sufficient 
dexterity to avoid obstacles. 
Reliability and fault tolerance are clearly of 
prime importance in this application. The manip- 
ulator must “fail safe” within the tank, to prevent 
possible spillage of the waste into the environment. 
In addition, in the event of a failure in the robot 
system, the arm must be removable from the tank. 
These requirements impose significant design restric- 
tions on the arm. Reliability is a key issue in the 
design phase, and our work in fault tree analysis is 
in support of the early design phase for the manipu- 
lator. Our fault trees include failure modes from the 
mechanical, sensor, and computer control subsystems 
as well as the human operator [17]. 
A standard qualitative analysis of the fault trees 
was useful, and resulted in a series of recommended 
changes to  the original manipulator design [17]. It 
is to be expected that a quantitative analysis will 
provide significant further insights. However, quan- 
titative reliability analyses of the fault trees is more 
problematic in the robotics application, due in part to 
uncertain data and repeated events in the trees. The 
following sections discuss these issues in more detail. 
3. FAULT TREE ANALYSIS FOR ROBOTS 
In this section, for the purpose of illustration, 
we first discuss a two-joint planar robot, with one 
position sensor and actuator at each joint. This robot 
represents a two joint subset of the original design for 
the waste retrieval arm considered in [17], and will be 
used here for demonstration purposes. A fault tree 
for a general manipulator would of course be much 
more detailed, but this basic example will serve to  
demonstrate many of the key issues in robot fault 
tree analysis. From a reliability point of view, the 
robot represented by Figure 2 is the least favorable 
design, since two joints are the minimum possible for 
arbitrary positioning in a planar workspace, and a 
failure in either sensor or actuator will typically lead 
to  a wild failure response [15]. With only a single 
sensor or actuator per joint, the control algorithm is 
vulnerable to errors and may incorrectly move the 
robot arm if a failure occurs. This basic robot failure 
scenario will be studied in the fault trees in this paper. 
Figure 2 shows a fault tree for the two joint robot in 
the plane where M 1 refers to the actuator (motor) 
on joint one, J 1. There is only a single sensor S 1 
at this joint. The second joint is similarly labeled. 
The trees have been evaluated using the FaultrEASE 
software package [ 191. 
From Figure 2, it can be observed that the fail- 
ure of any motor or sensor will lead to  robot failure. 
In order to improve the fault tolerance of the robot 
system, a glance at the fault tree reveals several mod- 
ifications that can be made to the robot. Perhaps, the 
simplest improvement is to add a redundant sensor at 
each joint. This is indicated by the AND gate with 
sensors S 1A and S 1B at J 1 in Figure 3. It is 
technically more difficult t o  add additional motors t o  
drive a joint of a robot. One possible solution is t o  
add entire additional joint assemblies, so that a three 
joint robot in the plane could gracefully degrade to a 
two joint robot in the presence of a fault in one of the 
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Figure 1: Design concept for hazardous waste retrieval robot. 
motors. It is assumed that it will be possible to  lock 
the failed joint and that the robot planning task can 
be modified to  compensate for the reconfiguration. 
Therefore, two of the three joints shown in the fault 
tree in Figure 3 must fail before there is robot oper- 
ational (top event) failure. The fault tree has been 
drawn explicitly to  show the pairings of the robot 
joints. There are 12 cutsets in this fault tree. For 
example, the primary events M 1, S 2A, and S 2B 
form a cutset. The various sensors and motors now 
appear as repeated events within the fault tree. This 
tree structure and modification is typical of the type 
of results obtained in qualitative analysis of more de- 
tailed robot fault trees [17]. In the following section, 
quantitative aspects of the analysis of these trees will 
be presented to  illustrate the issues and difficulties 
inherent in the case of the more detailed robot fault 
trees. 
4 ,  QUANTITATIVE ISSUES 
For some robot subsystems, standard techniques 
[13] can be used to  analyze their reliability through 
fault trees. However, a key difficulty for quantitative 
reliability analysis of robots is that reliability data 
for important subsystems and components is not well 
established or trusted. This is particularly true for 
robots to  be deployed in hazardous and radioactive 
environments [15]. In many cases, reliability data for 
robot components in these environments is at best ap- 
proximately known. Thus, in order to  quantitatively 
analyze the overall fault trees, some type of approx- 
imate analysis, which combines conventional reliabil- 
ity analyses for well understood subsystems with reli- 
ability estimates for less well understood subsystems, 
is required. 
One useful type of approximate analysis is based 
on the technique of interval analysis [6] where ranges 
of numbers are systematically combined. Range fail- 
ure information is an attractive option in the case 
of uncertain data, and may be readily derived from 
existing data. For example, failure rate data for non- 
radioactive environments [l] can be expanded into a 
failure rate interval to  study the reliability of robots 
used in hazardous radioactive environments. This ap- 
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Figure 2: Fault Tree for a basic two joint planar robot. 
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Figure 3: Fault Tree for a redundant three joint robot with multiple sensors. 
proach, which allows for “approximate”, or “fuzzy)) 
failure probabilities, is strongly related to fuzzy logic 
techniques [4, 12, 181 for dealing with uncertainty in 
the data. We will next use the fault trees from the 
previous section to outline one such approach, which 
is based on manipulating (based on subsystem relia- 
bility estimates and the structure of the fault trees) 
approximate ranges of subsystem reliabilities. 
Table 1 shows reliability interval data that is 
derived from the 1995 Nonelectronic Parts Reliabil- 
ity Data (NPRD-95) failure rate tables [I]. It was 
observed in NPRD-95 that 68 percent of failure rates 
will be between 0.22 and 4.5 times the reported value. 
Furthermore, 90 percent of failure rates were between 
0.8 and 11.9 times the reported value. The total m i s -  
sion operation time for the robot to  operate in a sin- 
gle underground storage tank would be on the order 
of 1,000 hours. The robot would then be carefully 
decontaminated and removed from the tank. Mainte- 
nance would be performed and then the robot would 
be moved to  the next tank at the Hanford site to 
continue waste removal. In this case, an approxi- 
mate probability of failure E131 was determined as At ,  
where t = 1000 hours. Since the robot will be used in 
a hazardous radiation environment which is beyond 
the scope of NPRD-95, the failure probability was ex- 
panded over an interval. The given failure probability 
p is expanded into an inner interval Epl,p,] such that 
p~ = 0 . 8 ~  and pT = 4 . 5 ~  and an outer interval bl l ,pTT]  
such that pn = 0 . 2 2 ~  and pTT = 1 1 . 9 ~ .  The four point 
interval based on the NPRD-95 ranges is shown in 
Figure 4. Using these estimates, Table 1 shows the 
interval data to  be used in the fault tree analysis. For 
the electric motor the base failure probability from 
NPRD-95 is p = 0.00924 and for the optical encoder 
sensor the failure probability is p = 0.0155. 
For the basic two joint robot described in Fig- 
ure 2, the following probabilities shown in Table 2 
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Component 
Electric Motor 
Optical Encoder Sensor 
I I l l  I 
IC ‘r rr 0 
~ 
PI1 PI PT Pr T 
0.000739 0.00203 0.0416 0.11 
0.00124 0.00341 0.0698 0.184 
1 
Figure 4: Failure probability interval. 
Table 1: Reliability Estimates for Redundant Planar Robot Components. 
were calculated for the top event. These inner and 
outer component failure probability intervals are nu- 
merically propagated through the fault tree to pro- 
duce intervals for the top level failure event. This 
approach is similar to  the fuzzy analysis in [la]. The 
exact probability of failure is p = 0.0490 in this case. 
A similar quantitative analysis can be performed 
for the three joint redundant planar robot shown in 
Figure 3. This configuration shows a reduction in 
failure probability due to  the additional sensors and 
joint. The exact probability of failure of the top event 
is p = 0.000268. 
The robot fault tree discussed above for the fault 
tolerant robot displays repeated events a t  the sen- 
sor level, leading to  added complexity in a quanti- 
tative analysis [9]. From this analysis, the proba- 
bility of robot operational failure has been reduced 
from p = 0.0490 to  p = 0.000268. This repre- 
sents an improvement of approximately a factor of 
200 for the redundant fault tolerant design for the 
mission time of 1,000 hours. It is also interesting 
to  note that the worst case outer failure probabil- 
ity interval point for the three joint redundant robot, 
prr = 0.0534 fits within the inner failure probability 
interval, [p[,pr]  = [0.0109,0.223] for the basic non- 
fault tolerant two joint planar robot design. This 
data shows that the additional complexity in adding 
redundant sensors and joints yields tangible reliabil- 
ity improvements. The quantitative analysis backs 
up the intuitive qualitative analysis surrounding the 
initial discussion of the fault trees. With multiple 
sensors present, it becomes important to  have effi- 
cient fault detection algorithms to  make use of this 
redundancy. 
5. APPLICABILITY AND FUTURE WORK 
The potential for successful application of fault 
trees in robotics extends well beyond the design phase 
discussed in this paper. One proposed approach for 
the use of fault trees as a framework for real-time 
robot fault tolerance software is discussed in [14]. A 
critical issue here is that of including fault detection 
and coverage in the analysis. The timescale for the 
occurrence of robot faults is typically on the order 
of many hours, where undetected and/or uncovered 
fablts typically critically affect the system in the or- 
der of milliseconds. Thus techniques which combine 
the concise representation of fault trees with efficient 
coverage models will be important in the future. 
The approach suggested in [3], which decom- 
poses fault occurrence and fault recovery into two sep- 
arate submodels, appears to  be have significant po- 
tential for robotics. The approach, which combines 
fault tree and coverage models efficiently, could be 
directly applicable for those subsystems of the robot 
(control computer, etc. ) whose coverage models can 
be consistently defined independent of the robot con- 
figuration or task. 
One critical complication with robot manipula- 
tors is that other fault detection models, for example 
for those subsystems in motion within the arm (sen- 
sors, actuators, etc) will be configuration-dependent, 
i.e. vary with each manipulator motion trajectory. 
This means that coverage models must be augmented 
with trajectory dependent information. For example, 
consider fault detection for a robot wrist joint posi- 
tion sensor. For the manipulator performing a “pick 
and place” task, it is mostly the shoulder and elbow 
(proximal) joints that are used for gross positioning. 
In this case, the wrist (distal) joints are moved very 
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Table 2: Reliability Estimates for Basic Two Joint Planar Robot Failure. 
PI1 PI 
Robot Failure 0.00000164 0.0000125 
I Prr I Pl I Pr I Prr 
Robot Failure 1 0.00396 I 0.0109 I 0.223 I 0.588 
Pr Pr r 
0.00622 0.0534 
Table 3: Reliability Estimates for Redundant Planar Robot Failure. 
sparingly, if at all. Thus, the wrist sensor readings 
are largely isolated from effects from the remainder of 
the arm, and spurious wrist sensor readings (perhaps 
from a terminal sensor fault) will be relatively easy 
to  distinguish and isolate. However, in the case of 
rapid fine motions (largely involving the wrist joints), 
dynamic coupling between the wrist joints can intro- 
duce significant errors in the controller, which enter 
the sensor readings as extra noise [16]. In this case 
fault detection becomes a much more complex prob- 
lem [16], the coverage model takes a different form, 
and probabilities are significantly altered. 
This simple example motivates the need for 
more dynamic coverage models than are in operation 
at the present time. Most fault detection methods 
currently employed in robots are quite ad hoc, and 
are based on comparing sensor readings with expected 
other sensed values, and masking normal sensor er- 
rors with fixed thresholds. These thresholds are de- 
termined empirically for specific trajectories. The im- 
precision in this approach has led to  both false alarms 
and missed faults [15]. Algorithms for robot fault 
detection which theoretically guarantee complete de- 
tection and coverage for robot arms under certain 
assumptions have been established and analyzed re- 
cently [16]. However, much more work needs to  be 
done in the area of robot coverage models in order to  
draw general conclusions regarding robot fault cover- 
age. 
In conclusion, we have found that fault trees are 
an excellent technique for analyzing reliability and 
fault tolerance in a multidisciplinary area such as 
robotics. Qualitative fault tree analyses have proved 
valuable for various robotic applications [5, 7, 15,171. 
Quantitative analyses for robotics are more problem- 
atic due to  the limited data on these custom systems. 
However, such estimates are important in the manip- 
ulator design process, and the techniques discussed 
in this paper offer a systematic technique for quan- 
titative analysis of reliability and fault tolerance for 
robots. 
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